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INFINITY IN A GRAIN OF SAND:
THE WORLD OF LAW AND LAWYERING
AS PORTR.AYED IN THE CLINICAL
TEACHING IIVIPLICIT IN THE
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUlVi

Howard Lesnick*

I.

THE SETTING

I believe that law teachers systematically portray the world of
law and lawyering to students in ways that, to a great extent, distort
their own beliefs.

This Essay explores that perceived dissonance,

and describes one attempt to resolve it.

*
Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. A.B. 195 2, New York University; A.M. 1953, LL.B. 1958, Columbia
University.
My thoughts and understanding have benefited enormously from my association
over six fruitful years with many faculty and student colleagues at the City University of
New York Law School at Queens College. Of special salience was my intensive work
with Professors John Farago, Jack Himmelstein, and Vanessa Merton (now Associate
Dean and Director of Clinical Programs at Pace University School of Law) during the
initial planning year (198 2-83). I long ago lost the capacity to discern the boundaries
between what I brought to our common enterprise and what I learned from them.
I am grateful, too, to Carrie Menkel-Meadow and the participants in the UCLA
Warwick Second International Conference on Clinical Legal Education, for their sup
port and ideas, and to Jack Himmelstein and my University of Pennsylvania colleagues
George Haskins, Stephen Morse, and Michael Schill for helpful responses to a draft of
this essay.
I owe the title (but not, I hasten to confess, the subtitle) also to John Farago, and
through him to William Blake, whose words deserve to be rendered unmodified:
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.
W. BLAKE, Auguries of Innocence, in WILLIAM BLAKE: POETRY AND DESIGNS 209
(M. Jo.hnson & J. Grant eds. 1979).
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My initial premise is that all law teaching is clinical teaching.
By that , I mean that much of what we teach is taught implicitly,
and even a course with an explicit agenda that is oriented to a field
of substantive law inevitably will contain many implicit messages
about what it means to be a lawyer. 1

The dichotomy between

teaching about law and teaching about lawyering is porous, first,
because the lawsuits that are the vehicle for studying substantive
law contain many messages about lawyering and� second, because
one's premises about law itself, even if implicit in the study of a
legal subject, have powerful implications for the lawyer's role as
well.

The law of professional responsibility, for example, is to a

significant degree shaped by conceptions of lawyering that have
their ideological anchor in the underlying premises of contract law.
The study of contracts, although ordinarily not addressing that con
nection explicitly, predisposes students to view the lawyer's work in
ways that are consistent with the premises of contract law.
To some significant extent, the premise that in teaching law we
also teach lawyering is today not controversial, condemned perhaps
more as banal than as mistaken.

I have in mind, however, more

than the familiar litany of themes captured by the notion of "think
ing like a lawyer:" awareness of, and the ability to use, the ambigu
ity of language, the elusiveness of facts, the subjectivity and
ambivalent guidance of values, and the centrality of procedure and
of the concepts of institutional competence and role.

My conten

tion is that what we are (predictably) taken to say about being a
lawyer is far less measured and qualified than what we may mean to
say. Intention is not the end of the matter, and the actual content of
our teaching, I will suggest, goes a significant way beyond what
many teachers would (rather proudly) acknowledge.
Several aspects of the educational experience, of which individ
ual teachers tend to take insufficient account, affect the reach of that
implicit teaching.

The first is the differing way teachers and stu

dents apprehend legal education. Teachers tend to think of the stu
dent's experience, and the goals and methods of law school, as a
three-year enterprise. Conscious as we must be of the ungraspable
reach of the learning agenda, we tend to seek balance-within and
among history, doctrine, theory, professional identity, and skill1. The reference in the subtitle to the "clinical teaching" in a traditional curricu
lum is not therefore to the ''clinics" and similar lawyering-focused programs now a
fairly common portion of the traditional curriculum. I write here almost entirely of the

"classroom," law-focused courses that make up virtually all of the early, and the bulk of

the later, experience that students have of law school.
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over the entire curriculum. Specifically, we tend to think of the first
vear more as a foundation for what is to follow than as a summary
immersion in the whole. This tendency is a natural one, for we re
side in the experience over time, as a faculty viewing it as a whole

and as indi vi dual s teaching in vari ous aspects of it from year to
year.
The experience of students is quite different. Their immersion

is both fuller and narrower, far more intensive and far less exten
sive. The intensity is at its height in the first year� particularly in
the first semester; it is total (or near-total) for that one cycle, with
no opportunity to revisit the earlier experience in the light of the

latter. I believe that it is what is imprinted in that initial immersion,
and not any broader message of the three years, that shapes stu
dents' consciousness of what is important and not important to be
ing

a

lawyer.

Any significant shift in the portrayal of law and

lawyering in subsequent courses does not alter students' "map" of
the legal world.2 Rather, students judge that shift in light of what
has gone before. What does not fit into the imprinted pattern stu
dents tend to cabin off and treat as peripheral, exceptional, or
questionable.
If this perception is correct, we must say what we mean to say
early on, as a full portion of the students' initial immersion in law
study, for students will hear subsequent corrections, completions,
and elaborations in ways that do not essentially alter the framework
initially set forth, and will take supplementation of the initial
message as more a comment on the supplementer than a modifica
tion of the message.
Moreover, the perceived content of an individual teacher's as
sertions is affected by the ubiquity of that message in the whole of a
student's law school experience.

For a teacher to emphasize only

some aspects of the complex totality of a lawyer's function may not
be in itself a serious distortion, but if each of a student's teachers
makes a similar selection of attributes, the overall message will
surely be that the omitted qualities are of no great importance. In
short, a selectivity justified as a mere division of labor or function
can operate as such only if what teachers omit in one part they
supply in another.

Yet that is seldom the case, especially in the

crucial first year; in most students' experience, their teachers es
pouse roughly the same catalogue of lawyerly virtues.

2. The term is Leonard Riskin's. See Riskin, Jlfediation and Lawyers, 43 OHio
ST. L.J. 29, 43-46 (1982).
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Finally, the implicit quality of the assertions augments their
power: by not putting a question on the table for examination, while
acting on the basis of an answer to it, a teacher in effect tells his or
her students that acceptance of the answer is part of a proper defin.i
tion of a lawyer. Controversy over the acceptability of the answer
presumably is to be resolved prior to the decision to sign on to the
law school enterprise; dissenters made (or were) an admissions
error.

II.

THE IMPLICIT CURRICULUM

My hypothesis is that we can discern in legal education the
assertion of a number of significant truths about lawyering and law;
that much of the content of these assertions is not congruent with
what many law teachers would avow; and that where the assertions
are explicit or would be avowed, they are typically asserted as axi
oms, as "givens," rather than as the subject of exploration and
choice.

I cannot proffer a complete set of such assertions, and I

recognize that there are discernible differences among teachers and
schools. Nonetheless, I believe that a recognizable implicit curricu
lum is for the most part alive and well in the experience of the great
majority of law students. 3
To make this hypothesis more concrete, I examine three "case
studies. " They exemplify much, although certainly not all, of what
I will catalogue as the content of the messages about being a lawyer

that I see implicitly espoused in the law school curriculum. Recog
nizing that anecdotes can illustrate, but not document, a thesis, I
3. I will focus only on the implicit messages of the explicit curriculum, that is, of
the content of the courses. The idea of an implicit curriculum-the idea that much of
what we teach about being a lawyer we transmit by the attitudes and practices that we
model-goes much further, however, and applies to such areas of law school life as the
admissions and placement processes, relaiions of faculty and students with the nonpro
fessional staff, and the bases on which we choose people to speak at school functions,
receive awards, judge moot court, or have their pictures hung on our walls. It means
little, for example, to talk about respect and concern for the disadvantaged as a social
value if at the same time we reinforce by our conduct the widespread tendency to give
people our attention, and our honors, on the basis of prestige, titles, and authority.
Consider the criticisms of so mainstream a figure as former N.Y.U. Law School Dean
and New York City Bar Association President Robert McKay:
Law schools measure their success in terms of the positions taken by their
graduates-the larger the law firm, the more prestigious the practice; the
higher the court for which a clerkship is secured, the more likely is the
candidate to move on to successful corporate practice. There is nothing
wrong with these goals; it is simply that one wonders if that is all the re is
to the profession.
McKav. Bevond Professional Res{Jonsibilitv, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 709, 710 (1981).
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invite the reader to conside r whether that content resonates with his
or her own sense of what is true.4
A.

Three Case Studies
Since we cannot all have shared a single classroom experience,

I will look to the closest thing to it. I want too to make it clear that
I am not speaking of "Kingsfieldism" or any supposed abuses of the
system, but of what is mainstream, high-quality, core. On both ac
counts, I cannot begin in a better way than by looking to the
lfarvard Law Review. I will examine the discussion of the Supreme
Court's decision in lVLRB v.

Yeshiva University 5 in the Supreme

Court Note of November 1980.6
1.

A Harvard Law Review Note

The thesis of the Note is that the case was wrongly decided. In
Yeshiva, the Supreme Court held that university professors at some
universities are managerial employees excluded, albeit implicitly,
from the protection of the National Labor Relations Act.7 Essen
tially, the Note asserts that the Court made a mistake in harmoniz
ing the legislative decisions to protect the self- organizational rights
of professional, but not those of managerial, employees.

The con

cluding sentence fully sums up the whole burden of the essay: "The
Court should have adopted the analysis of the dissent. "8

All the

Note says explicitly is that the case was wrongly decided. However,
the implicit assertions are much broader and more fundamental.9
4. In a luminous essay, White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54
TENN.L. REV. 161 (1987), James Boyd White described the approach to which I am
drawn:
I invite the reader to check what I say against what he or she knows .. . .
Rather than making a case that is meant to stand or fall by the degree to
which the unwilling are compelled to assent to it . . . I mean to present a
set of reflections ... to be tested against the reader's own.
!d. at 167. I believe that such an approach more fully enables fundamental questions to
be opened up, rather than shut off, and is a necessary supplement to the prevailing
approach, which not only values logical inference and empirical inquiry, but tends to
view them as the exclusive bases of persuasiveness and academic respectability.
5. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
6. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 77, 251-61 (1980).
7. YeshiYa, 444 U.S. 672.
8. Note, supra note 6, at 26 1 .
9. I have chosen this Note in part because I agree with the position it takes. I
regard the Yeshiva University decision as a dreadful example of conservative judicial
activism. I can therefore use the Note as an example of something that concerns me
without triggering the response that I am simply unhappy with the students' preferred
result.
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The Note asserts, first, that law,
rational affair,
matter:

a

or

at least adjudication, is a

process of reasoning-that it is largely

the legislature

makes value

judgments

a

technical

in enacting a statute,

and the Court uses techniques or doctrines of institutional compe

tence to decide cases under it.10 The principles of statutory con
struction are one example; the principles of judicial review are
another. The Note asserts that the Court erred in the purpose it
attributed to the legislative action of including professionals and

g

cl u din

ex

managers.

Second, the Note says implicitly that to exercise one's critical
judgment about a legal question (and of course that is what it is
doing-these are not simply hacks telling you what the law is)
means to engage in evaluation rather than explanation or under
standing.

The Note contains nothing to help anyone understand

how it was that the Supreme Court made this mistake. One might
speculate, but there is not a word that would explain the result.
The real issues that would shape one's reaction to the underlying
problem that gave rise to the litigation are never even set out, much
less analyzed. It is not self-evident what the "real" issues are, but to
me they have to do with one's view of the relationship between
union and member, and between employer and employee, in partic
ular, professional employee. That question is not connected to the
explanation of the decision at all.
The implicit quality of the preceding statements gives them
much unspoken content about the job of being a lawyer. First, we
are all pretty much doing the same job. The judges, majority and
dissent, the Harvard Law Review editors, the Harvard Law School
labor law teachers, you and I, and perhaps even counsel (albeit
counsel is committed to

a

result) are all engaged in bringing our

intellectual powers to bear on reasoning a problem through to a
solution.

10. Legal education in many ways has long contained the implicit assertion that
adjudication is by far the largest part of law, and nearly the only part worth thinking
about. The Harvard Law Review has no annual "Congress Note." As Michael Fitts has
observed:
For most of our history, the legislative process ...has not been the focus
of sustained legal scholarship....
When the legal profession did scrutinize the internal mechanisms of
the legislative process . .. [it] often viewed them somewhat in the manner
of a common law judge reviewing the opinions in prior cases-rationalis
tic and public-regarding.
Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the
Legislative Process,

136 U. PA. L REV.

1564, 1569-71 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
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am

not asserting that the preceding statements are incorrect,

but that their accuracy is likely to be partial and in any event is not
self-evident

or ax iom at ic .

Further, they are far more central to our

thinking about law and learning law than questions that have to do
with the h a rm onization of the managerial-professional dichotomy
under the NLRA. To the extent that we do not make the correct
ness of those statements the explicit agenda, we are ma kin g the fur
ther assertion that

a

good lawyer does not question the view that

law is rational, that the legislature makes the critical value judg
ments, that interpretation is a technical problem, and that the essen

tial problem of criticism is to evaluate rather than to understand or
explain.

The Yeshiva case-both the dispute out of which the litigation
arose and the Supreme Court's treatment of the legal question
bristles with values conflicts regarding collective bargaining and
unionization, the relation between employees and the union to
which they belong, authority in the workplace, and the duty of loy
alty assertedly owed to one's employer. By excluding all such ques
tions from discussion, the Note silently (that is, loudly) asserts that
our values, emotions, and concerns in these areas have nothing to
do with our work as lawyers. Indeed, the implicit message is that
such concerns too easily get in the way of good lawyering� and that
the task of legal training is to facilitate the compartmentalization
and repression of concerns over such matters in favor of what might
be termed a "moot court" view of lawyering. Like the judges, the
lawyers are all simply doing technical work, and a "good" legal job
implicates such major matters as one's tangible conditions of em
ployment and such minor matters

as

the length of one's commute to

and from home. It is a simple further step to the presumption that
the distribution or availability of legal services surely cannot be a
serious problem, for it is almost a random event that a lawyer hap
pens to represent one cause rather than another, one adversary
rather than another.
I can view the implicit messages of the Yeshiva Note as broadly
as I do only if I am correct in viewing it as neither simply an in
stance of flawed law review writing nor as atypical in its approach,
only if one can find similar analyses of legal questions in the daily
experience of law students affecting the treatment of upper- lev el,
regulatory or lawyering courses as well as the classic first-y e ar or

"private lavv"

core

curriculum. I therefore turn to

examine

two ad

ditional case studies, one in the area of professional responsibility, a
field presumably committed to examining issues of lawyers' roles,

UCLA LAW REVIEV(

1164

[v01 .);:11
'">""/
s�r
·

.

•

1

I

and the other a problem in adminstrative law, a course that presum

ably complements any perceived narrowness in the first-year experi
ence. I believe Ihat each illustrates powerfully how difficult it is to
leaven the implicit messages of law school.
2.

A Forum on Professional Responsibility
Judge John Ferren, formerly a leading corporate and public

interest lawyer, presented a hypothetical problem to a forum on
professional responsibility problems of the corporate lawyer. 1 1
Briefly, the situation is this: you are outside counsel to an aircraft
manufacturer, Trireme Aluminum Company. The chief engineer of
the company-someone you have known as a friend over the
years-tells you in confidence that he is very disturbed about the
safety of a new alloy being used in a new plane. The alloy passed all
safety tests, but the engineer fears the tests do not sufficiently screen
for the unusually high altitude, and accompanying extreme cold
and extreme low pressure, that will characterize the plane in use.
He tells you that some of his staff share his fears and some do not,
and concludes: "Whatever you do, don't use my name."
The problem postulates that you go to the company president,
whom you know fairly well, and ask (in a way that does not identify
the engineer as your source) whether there is a problem with the
new alloy. The president rather shortly says that a couple of people
in the engineering department were worried, but that he looked into
it and learned that most of the engineers say it is perfectly all right.
(The president's statement is in fact true.) You are hesitant to drop
the point, but the president gets very upset when you persist. We
can imagine that his response proceeds something like this: "Look,
this development has turned us around; we were a failing company,
as you well know, and now we are marketing this plane. It is a fine
plane, there's no problem, and starting rumors will destroy the
company; we will all be out on the street, and the whole city will
hate us, if we recall this plane. So just forget it." He is quite upset.
The problem first asks whether you may, or must, bring this
issue to the board of directors. Next, the problem hypothesizes that
you do raise the issue at the board level. The president states that
he has looked into this question, that a couple of people think there
may be a safety problem but most do not, and that he thinks there is
no problem. The chairman of the board thanks you for your inter11.

See

Ferren,

The Corporate Lawyer's Obligation io the Public Interest, 33 Bus.

LAW. 1253, 1253-54 (1978).
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est, notes that lawyers traditionally are worriers, and says that while
it is useful to have people play that role, Harry over here is the
president because we trust him, and we can regard the matter as

now closed. He turns to the next agendum.

Of course, the next thing that happens is that a plane crashes,
killing a number of people. The Federal Aviation Adminstration
issues a directive, which, in effect, grounds the new plane pending
an investigation, and serves the company with a subpoena demand

ing production of certain records. The company asks you to stop
the investigation. You can file a motion asserting that, under the
applicable substantive law, there is an inadequate basis for the di
rective and asking to have it stayed. You can file a second motion
asse rt ing that unless there is a valid pending proceeding the sub
poena has no legal basis, and seeking to quash the subpoena unless
and until the court rules against Trireme on your first motion. The
result of success in this double-barrelled attack would be to get the
planes flying again, while hindering an investigation of the cause of
the cr�sh.
The problem goes on to analyze your obligations.

I am not

interested in the substance of the issue, but in the way the presenta
tion considers it.

The questions discussed are these:

(1)

is with

drawal as counsel at any one of the steps described permissible
under DR 2-llO(C) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibil
ity?; 12 (2) if you do withdraw, may you (in light of applicable Bar
Association opinions) tell your successor-to whom the chief engi
neer would certainly not say anything-what you know?; and

(3)

what are your obligations under DR 7-102 vis-a-vis the investiga
tion that is going on on behalf of the public? DR 7-102(B)(l) pro
vides that, if a lawyer learns that it has been clearly established that
a client has perpetrated a fraud on a person or tribunal, disclosure is
compulsory unless the information was privileged.13 The presenta
tion discusses whether fraud has been established, and whether
clearly so or not, and then whether a person or tribunal has been
the victim: does "a person" mean an individual, or may it extend to
society at large? Is an agency a "tribunal" when it is acting in an
investigative rather than an adjudicative capacity, or may it now be
12. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C) (1980)
(enumerating situations in which an attorney is permitted to withdraw). The problem
was pubiished prior to the appearance of the Model Rules on the scene. See MoDEL

RULES OF PROFESSiONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(c) (1983) (permissive withdrawal in the
context of organization violations of the law); see also id. Rule 1.16(b) (permissive with
drawal generally).
13.

See lVIODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR

7-102(B)(l) (1980).

UCLA LArV REV1Ef-'V

1166
viewed more as

an

adversary than

a
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court? FinallyJ is this

a

case of

pri'/i1eged communication?
The discussion concludes by observing that the problem is
probably an unreal one, for no such extreme case has actually
arisen. There is an explicit assertion that, if this situation did occur,
it would have become clear to everyone early

on

that disclosure was

inevitable; and the real solution to a dilemma like this (which is a
real dilemma in other cases) is an early, credible threat of with
drawal by the attorney. If the Bar would be clearer with clients as
to the conditions under which its members will withdraw from rep
resentation, it would be relatively easy to keep clients in line.
Again, the point of reflecting on this problem is not to say that
any of its explicit assertions are wrong. If we were to look at this
problem, not for the answers it gives to a hypothetical professional
responsibility problem, but to observe the way that lawyers see the
problem, what would we observe?
First, ethical problems are treated as legal issues.

The ques

tions are whether a certain action constitutes fraud, whether the
FAA constitutes a tribunal, whether the statement is a privileged
communication, and whether withdrawal would prejudice the cli
ent. There is no discussion of why that is so. It seems self-evident.
But we are talking about an unusual source of law.

The ABA

Model Code of Professional Responsibility is something between
the Ten Commandments and a press release.

The American Bar

Association is a private organization, and its pronouncements have
no legal force. Of course, in one form or another the Code is--or
was-law in the sense that the Supreme Court of every state
promulgated it. But if you ask why we have to follow it, the going
gets a bit slippery. One answer is that one who violates the Code
may get into trouble.

Some discussions say that explicitly: would

you be "in trouble" considering the language of DR "X" or in light
of ABA Opinion "Y", if you did this? The accurate answer is that
you very likely will not be in trouble no matter what you do. Very
few lawyers are disciplined, and especially not in mind-boggling,
agonizing matters like the Trireme problem.

You really do not

have to worry on that account.14

14. Recent years have seen a partial erosion of attorney insulation from the risk of
discipline in a case such as Trireme, although the "discipline" is more likely, in my
observation, to take the form of litigation asserting the attorney's liability to a person
injured by a breach of professional ethics than the form of a disciplinary proceeding. I
do not think that this trend has yet progressed far enough to explain the phenomenon
disc•Jssed in the text, which long antedated it in any event.
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Perhaps, of course, the point refers to the moral basis of the
Code. There was a time when many lawyers viewed the Code as
something like the Ten Commandments15 but I doubt many lawyers
believe that today. Richard Abel has obse rved that the change in
names-from Canons of Ethics to Code o f Responsibility to Rules
of Conduct-expresses "a progressive dedine in normativity." 16

One of the by-products of the controversy over the drafting and
adoption of the Model Rules is that both the Code and the Rules
are now even more than before viewed not as a body of moral
norms, but simply as positive law1 and as open to criticism, avoid
ance, or evasion

as

any other act of a lawmaking body.

Nevertheless, the Trireme problem assumes that ethical issues
are answerable in legal terms.

And this view, it should be noted,

applies to both the high side and the low side: if "whistle-blowing"
(or other action inconsistent with

a

client's wishes or interests) is

required by the Code, a lawyer must blow the whistle, and if it is
not required by the Code, he or she may not, because the duty of
loyalty fills all the rest of the space. In Orwellian terms, everything
is either forbidden or compulsory. In this environment, problems of
ethics or responsibility-what action do I choose to take, or feel
called upon to take?-come to be viewed as problems of advocacy:
what actions can I justify as permiss�ble or, better yet, obligatory?17
Second, as the process of legal analysis continues, it acquires
accelerating complexity. A relatively simple problem- not simple
in its solution, but simple factually-becomes a multi-layered law
review article. There are six crucial words of the Code needing con
struction; there are several Bar Association Opinions needing rec15. A lawyer once said that to me explicitly, with reference to the 1974 A BA
amendment regarding group legal services (one of the controversial and short-lived
"Houston" amendments). When I responded that it has never been reported that the
Ten Commandments were amended by a vote of 140 to 117, he shrugged; he viewed the
Code as per se morally authoritative.
16. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 686
n.257 (1981)
17. One consequence, in the context of this problem, of the focus on legal answers
to ethical questions seems especially bizarre. Great attention is paid to the questions of
disclosure and withdrawal, but none to the fact that the attorney is asked to move from
passively aiding or protecting the company by silence, to actively seeking to keep the
planes flying by filing motions designed to fend off the FAA. The explanation for this
priority, I believe, is nothing more than the fact that filing motions is thought to raise
ethical problems only when they are substantively groundless. See MoDEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFES
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983). I cannot imagine that anyone other than a lawyer
would perceive this phenomenon as anything but grievously astigmatic. See infra text
.

accompanying note 18.

UCLA LAW REV!El!V

1168

[Vol. 37:1157

finished, a sense of bewilderment
interacts with the fact that the problem is viewed as a legal rather
than an ethical problem, so that a decision to do nothing seems
onciliation.

By the time one is

comfortable. After all, what does one do after reading ten pages of
dense legal analysis about a moral problem? One says, "Well, that's
a hard question and who knows what is right," and goes on to
something else, not having engaged with the broader dimensions of
the problem and channeled toward a response that avoids the need
to do so.
Seeing the question as a legal issue, and multiplying the com
plexity and subtlety of the legal issues, removes from thought the
real question, and the omission from the discussion of any consider
ation of the moral dimensions of the question nails down the re
moval. Again, what the "real" question is may not be self-evident.
To me, it is this: what do you do if you, an autonomous professional
genuinely concerned about the danger but recognizing that you do
not really know how substantial it is, are told by this powerful, suc
cessful, fairly aggressive person whom you represent, not to worry
about it? You are reluctant to drop the matter because you are
afraid that the company president may not really be open to hearing
the problem, and part of your job, as well as your responsibility to
yourself, is to worry. On the other hand, he is intimidating you and
might fire you or lose confidence in you. More than that, you re
spect him: he knows more about this matter than you do, and if you
have been representing him, you probably think that he is doing an
admirable job under dreadful circumstances.

When the president

tells you not to worry about it, that he knows all about it, and has
decided everything is all right, it is not just lust for a fee that keeps
you quiet. Your tendency to remain silent is reinforced (if you have
any sense) by some humility about whether he may be right. Trust
me, he says, and says it with a smile and with a fist. And both of
them are effective.
That to me is the real problem, and an extremely agonizing
problem it is, of being a lawyer: how do you keep your self-respect
as a lawyer in that circumstance? The problem is transformed from
a painful to a stimulating one by viewing it as a series of legal com
plexities. By the time the panelists finish analyzing all the issues,
everyone is ready to shake hands all around, say that this has been a
very useful discussion-no one could possibly remember which
Code provision he or she thinks has been the crucial one-and go
off thinking: "\Veil, I'll just pick up
and go

on with

my work."

the next

matter in my 'in' box

The intellectual challenges of wrestling
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tic release from the grip of the problem as it would otherwise be
experienced.
Finally, the conclusion of the articl e

th at this is an extreme

-

case not likely to occur-legitimates the attitude that we really do
not have to worry too much about this kind of problem. It does not
get out of hand; only borderline, defensible issues come up, and it is
in everyone's interest, clients and lawyers, to do the right thing.
Thus, the analysis both illustrates the way, and reinforces the
process by which, our selves become removed from the legal
problems we work on as lawyers . Personal conflicts-whether over
conflicts between loyalty to client interest and concern over public
harms, or the conflict between one's self-image as an independent
professional and the power imbalance vis-a-vis the company presi
dent-are abstracted from the activity of lawyering.
Indeed, the message is not only that this does happen, but that
it needs to happen. Only in that way can we live with the tension.
For I think it is clear that the unspoken messages of the Trireme
discussion come through much more loudly to students than the
question of what constitutes a "tribunal" within the meaning of DR

7- 1 02(B). And the final assertion that is made is that a good lawyer
thinks and acts as all the other unexpressed assertions prescribe: a
good lawyer treats ethical problems as legal ones, attuned fully to
their accelerating complexity; a good lawyer does not talk about or
focus attention on the dilemma of how to deal with powerful clients
and maintain a sense of independence and integrity; and a good law
yer believes that the problem does not get out of hand, that it is
manageable.

3.

An Administrative Law Problem
A friend has begun his administrative law course with this

problem: assume that a newspaper has written a major expose about
the overuse of tranquilizing drugs in prisons. The article describes
extensive use of such drugs in cases where no real judgment has
been made that there is mental disturbance, including instances of
routine or punitive administration by guards and other unlicensed
personnel.

After a public furor, a quick scheduling of legislative

hearings, and a rush to posture before the media, the legislature
passes a law to stop this outrage. The statute is one sentence long:
"In order to protect the health of prisoners and the interests of soci
ety, the Commissioner of Corrections s h al l promulgate and enforce
rules to regulate the improper use of drugs in prisons . "
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The problem posed t o the class i s twofold. First, how shou ld
the Commissioner of Corrections go about deciding what to do?
Second, what should the Commissioner decide?
The first issue raises the question how an agency informs itself
prior to making decisions : should the Commissioner sit in his or her
office and think, read articles, seek the advice of a knowledgeable
friend or consultant, rely on the knowledge and priorities of the
staff, hold

a

hearing?

In legal terms, the case study raises issues

regarding legislative rule-making, the right to a hearing, and the
form of a hearing.

If there is to be

a

hearing, should the agency

publish a notice in the newspaper, should it write letters inviting
interested parties or groups to appear, should it let people appear in
person, should there be witnesses, should it make a record, should it
give participants the right of confrontation and cross-examination?
The second issue goes to the substance of the decision: the
problem assumes that the Commissioner does hold a hearing, and
asks or permits several organizations, such as the guards' union, the
ACLU, the drug companies, to make submissions. Students are to
play different roles, preparing testimony to be offered at the hearing.
The issues to some degree arise out of the parties' submissions:
should there be a requirement that drugs be administered only with
consent? Should there be a requirement that they be administered
only with the approval of a physician, a psychiatrist, or a panel of
physicians? Should their use be limited in time, or should the size
of the population receiving drugs be limited? Should there be sub
stantive safeguards, or other sorts of restrictions?
This is a sophisticated problem, well calculated to teach much
valuable administrative law matter, and nothing that follows denies
that. However, the problem also teaches, implicitly, a lot about law
and lawyering, and their interaction, that needs to be addressed ex
plicitly. If we look at the story as a series of events and not as a
series of legal problems to be debated, it contains, first, an excellent
illustration of a contradiction basic to the legal process. The news
paper and legislative furor illustrates the very real and significant
commitment to basic human values-specifically, individual dig
nity, autonomy, and privacy-that is part of law. Widespread pub
lication of a story like this affronts a widely held value that has
genuine force. The legislature feels that it must act. It cannot sim
ply say, "To hell with them, they're a bunch of junkies and cons
anyway. " And s o it acts.
At the same time, the legis l ature cannot do anything about the
problem. By that, I mean that the legislature cannot do anything
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',v ithout also affronting other values that it cares about.
One is simply the reluctance to spend money; another is an authori
tarian, punitive concept of penology, which is inconsistent with a
desire to do much about the problem; and a third is an expertise
oriented approach to professionalism in the medical area, and the
about it

use of medication, that the legislature has no interest in examining.
The legislature delegates the problem to an administrator and
declares it solved: we have taken care of this problem by assigning it
to this excellent person, whose job it is to do something about it.
The administrative process in this scenario plays the function of le
gitimating the claim that the legislature has "done something." Ob
viously, if all the legislature did was to pass a law saying that a
prestigious local law school should study the problem and publish
an article discussing it, people would find this action a bit irrespon
sible. But the administrative process legitimates delegation by mak
ing it credible to say that its outcome provides a solution. It does
this in part by providing a hearing that is regarded as fair.

The

hearing therefore must be fair enough to make that claim credible.
If the Commissioner simply said "this is what I think, " and pub
lished some regulations, there would be an outcry that he did not
listen to knowledgeable or interested parties. The outcry would be
fueled by objections to the result, but lent credence by the illegiti
macy of the process.
At the same time, we know that no matter what happens, no
matter how the hearing goes, no matter what the rules say, no mat
ter what procedures are followed, the prisoners will not get physi
cians who will protect them from unwarranted use of medication.
When the prisoners were out "in life" they did not have such doc
tors, and they will certainly not have them now. We know that this
rural prison of a thousand people is not going to have a staff of
psychiatrists overseeing a drug problem. We know that in any large
building you might name-probably not excluding the one in which
these words are being read-the use of medication is woefully exces
sive. Of course it is usually taken on a voluntary basis, but what we
mean by "voluntary" is rather subtle; what we mean is that the level
and kind of influences are regarded as acceptable. We label as "co
ercion" that which is not acceptable. Some "voluntary" drug users
are "influenced" by their doctors, some by their families, some by
their employers, and some by their perception of the alternatives.
Studying the problem in a classroom environment mirrors the
political re al ity.

Taking th e problem seriously validates the com
mi tment of the law to individual dignity and autonomy; yet the is-
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sues raised-the kind of hearing, the range of arguments, issues of
judicial review and substantial evidence-all assure that

no

matter

what happens, not much is going to change. The well-trained legal
mind is one that does not rebel against this fact. In contrast, a lay
person (for example, a professional from another profession, or a
first-year student still open to the charge of being a

"mushhead")

will often respond to a problem like this one by raising questions
such as : why are so many people in prison; why are prisons several
hundred miles away from the prisoners' homes; why are the drugs
there in the first place; why are drugs so readily available to people
generally? Our immediate reaction to each of these questions

is

to

say: "Hold on, none of them is relevant. We are not talking about
sentencing policy. You may think that there should not be prisons
with a thousand people in them, or that there should be community
treatment centers. We are not talking about that. You may think
that people should not have access to drugs just because they want
them, so you do not like prisoner consent as a safeguard.

\Ve are

not talking about that. You may think that urban blacks should not
be imprisoned in a locality that insures that their guards will be
mostly rural whites; you think that guards should be blacks from
the prisoners' own community, and who do not have clubs and the
like. We are not talking about that either."
That is what we teach, and that is what we are supposed to
teach: focus on the issue at hand, strip away what is not in question,
not open to question, or not obtainable in this forum. That method
has unquestioned value as a mind-training device.

It also has the

broader effect of making the problem unsolvable.

I do not mean

that it was solvable before� The problem is unsolvable because the
only way it can be solved is by changing a whole series of "givens"
regarding prisons, drugs, and the physician-patient relation in ways
that our society is not willing to do. The "professional" approach
to lawyering makes the input of the legal process and of lawyers
accommodate itself to that unsolvability.

So, if you represent the

ACLU, you write a first-rate brief that begins by giving up (by fail
ing even to ask for) six or eight important civil liberties goals be
cause you know that you cannot get them. You do not ask a court,
for example, to shut the prison down and open three smaller ones
nearer the prisoners' homes. You do not attack the Commissioner
as closed-minded or lacking in requisite independence because he or
she is a former district attorney, police officer, or parole officer. The
list of "unthinkable" objectives can go on.
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In teaching this problem as an administrative law problem, we
reinforce the message that the j ob of

a

lawyer is to achieve the best

result available within the limits presented . To be sure, the lawyer's
j ob is to look skep tically at what are asserted to be the limits, and to
press against them to the extent it seems productive to do so, but
then to accept w hat is given and work toward the best you can get
within those limits.

The limits themselves are not your problem,

and should not be made your problem.

If you cannot live with

that-and sometimes you may not be able to-- do not appear in the
case. Write an article for a magazine about prisons, become a war
den, run for the legislature, but do not work as a lawyer.
Embedded in that prescription is the premise that a half-loaf is
better than none, that a quarter-loaf is better than none, that an
eighth-loaf is better than none.

Being a good lawyer is accepting

reality, and getting what you can within it, instead of antagonizing
everybody and getting nothing. This comes up very clearly in the
work of lawyers who represent poor people, political dissidents, or
others who do not trust the prevailing social order or share its
premises.

And by keeping the assertions regarding lawyers' func

tion implied (or axiomatic), the traditional message fails to perceive
the presence of an issue of client autonomy and professional domi
nance. Should the lawyer, or the client, make decisions regarding
goals and tactics? The lawyer who defines the questions of his or
her client's values, with respect to objectives, as "getting something
rather than nothing" is making a decision by seeing no decision to
be made. We should not assume that a client participating in a legal
proceeding wants to "win" the legal proceeding no matter how lim
ited a victory is open to realistic hope, or no matter what "transac
tion costs" may have to be paid (by the client, not the lawyer) . That
may not be true at all.
B.

The Perceived Messages of the Law School Curriculum
I want now to draw on the three case studies, and on other

observations, to illustrate briefly the messages about being a lawyer
that the law school curriculum implicitly espouses.

1.

Legal Subjects Develop in Significant Isolation from One
Another, and Have a Substantial Coherence as "Fields"
To say that this proposition is generally asserted in our teach

ing is not to ignore the marked increase in recent years in the so
phistication of law teachers

w ith

respect to their recognition t hat

legal subjects-property, torts, and contracts, fo r example-fold in
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o n one another unceasingly. But I a m concerned now with the con
struction and execution of courses rather than with the themes of
contemporary scholarship.

In introductory classes or casebook

chapters, and in periodic moments of rediscovery during the semes
ter, the seamlessness of the web is recognized. But that acknowl
edgement is muted in the student's experience by the firmly stitched
seams of the casebooks, and by crowded syllabi that are thought to
leave space for only an occasional reference to a course whose
boundary has just been crossed or drawn in question-a reference
triggering the hope (known to be vain) that the "other" teacher will
attend to the frontier surrounding the boundary.
The compartmentalization of students' thinking is reinforced
by the use of traditional categories to divide teaching responsibili
ties. A division that looks arbitrary, unaccustomed, or controver
sial will raise questions that a familiar division will leave unstirred
or will turn aside. Indeed, given the focus on appellate opinions as
the basis for studying law, we would gain much by simply teaching
a single volume of the law reports for a semester. (What would the
Association of American Law Schools Directory do with a course
entitled "274 A. 2d"?) Students then would be forced to learn for
themselves the reasons for the familiar categories, in ways that
would not reflexively tum aside attention to the limits of those
reasons.
The substantive effect of compartmentalization is striking.

In

the Trireme problem, for example, thinking of the issues as ones of
"professional responsibility" (and therefore not, inter alia, "proce
dure") facilitates an approach that sees ethical questions in an attor
ney's silence, but not in an attorney's moving to quash a subpoena.
Studying procedure as a field of substantive law (and not one which
supplies a context for the study of professional responsibility) facili
tates an approach to the ethics of filing motions that focusses nar
rowly

on

questions

like

frivolousness,

delay,

and

Rule

11

sanctions. 1 8 The result is that in neither course would any notice be
taken of the ethical significance of filing the motion to quash, by
which the lawyer moves from a passive to an active role in enabling
the company to continue carrying on an extremely hazardous
activity.
Even more far reaching is the way that the habit of compart
mentalization channels one's thinking about fundamental questions
of lawyering. Learning the skill of focusing one's attention by nar1 8.

See, e. g. , FED. R . CIV. P. 1 1 (requiring san ctions for frivolous motions).
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rowing it too often brings with it the ready acceptance o f role-de
fined morality and exaggerated forms of moral skepticism and
relativism. 1 9
2.

The Core o f Law is Private Law, that Is, Governmental
Facilitation of Private Ordering; Regulation is a Latter-Day
Set of Exceptions
Here, too, recent changes have wrought less change than one

might assume.

Certainly, common-law development is now often

explicitly regulatory in its impulse, and the traditional "common
law" subjects are pervaded by statutory, even constitutional, inputs,
which are only in part codifications of the common law.

Yet the

fundamental points of departure, ideologically no less than histori
cally, remain: in contracts, the necessity and sufficiency of assent;
in torts, the requirements of fault and causation; in property, the
corollaries of the power to exclude; in civil procedure, the j udicial
system as passive adj udicator of disputes brought into the process
through private decision-making. If I may use my own words-not
as authority, but to avoid unacknowledged repetition-what is ob
servable with respect to labor law, traditionally thought of as an
upper-year "regulatory" course, is a fortiori so in the first year:
[T]he changes that have occurred are ideologically peripheral.
The periphery may be extremely complex and significant, but it
is nonetheless comprised of exceptions, each of which needs to be
justified as a departure from the norm. Moreover, neither a par
ticular regulatory program, nor its totality, is seen as embodying
a fundamental rejection of freedom of contract as a primary so
cial value. To the contrary, each regulatory program is explicitly
required to be construed to respect the principle of freedom of
contract as much as possible. 20

We can see the power of this premise in each of the three case
studies. The governing maxim is that people with power exercise it
as they wish, free of the need to account to others, unless they have
violated some applicable rule.

A company refuses to recognize a

union chosen to repesent its workers; a lawyer chooses to prefer his
client's interests over those of "the public; " a warden manages a
1 9. "Legal argument has a narrowing and focusing nature and when issues are put
beyond the scope of what is legally relevant . . . it does not seem fruitful to put class
time into them. From accepting their irrelevance to the argument, we often move im
perceptibly to thinking them irrelevant altogether. " E. DVORKIN, J. HIMMELSTEIN &
1-I. LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDU
CATION AND PROFESSIONALISM 2 ( 1 9 8 1 ).
20. Lesnick, The Consciousness of Work and the Va lues ofA merican Labor Law, 3 2
BUFFALO L . REV. 833, 845-46 ( 1 98 3 ).
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prison through widespread use of medication. I n each case, deter
mining whether power and discretion have been "abused" means
examining whether legal restraints on discretion have been observed
and responding to the perception of abuse in ways that intrude as
lightly

as

possible

on

pre-existing

allocations

of

power

and

discretion.

3.

The Core Skill of Lawyering I s Incisive Analytic Reasoning;
It Is Largely this Ingredient that Determines the Quality of
Legal Representation and Accounts for the Quality of
Judicial and Administrative Decisions
Law schools emphasize "legal reasoning" for good reasons. It

is difficult and challenging; it is in many ways the prerequisite of
deeper and broader thinking; premature or excessive skepticism
about its relevance to decision-making can sap the motivation to
master its challenges; students can study it in the large-class,
casebook-based format that the economics of legal education ap
pears to require. But even though a ballplayer cannot succeed with
out learning to hit, if a school of baseball taught only hitting until
neophytes succeeded at it, and left base running and fielding for
"later life," it would produce all too many competent hitters who
are not only disastrous in the field, but who are too often forced out
or picked off. Put at its simplest, recognizing the necessity of intel
lectual power to good lawyering or judging is a long way from con
ceding its sufficiency. Yet by dwelling for the most part on analytic
ngor,

law

schools

consciousness.

21

tend

to

conflate

the

two

in

students'

Law study systematically exaggerates the importance o f the
merits, the existence of a cause of action or defense, and systemati
cally pays insufficient attention to other inputs to the quality of rep
resentation, such as the availability and quality of counsel and other
litigation resources, and to the vagaries of marshalling and present
ing a case, let alone to "nonlegal" factors affecting the perceptions

2 1 . The emphasis on the intelligence or analytic prowess of judges or judicial nomi
nees is illustrative. How often is it deemed somewhat inappropriate to criticize the
work product of a j udge or justice who can be defended as "really sharp"? That Daniel
Manion may have been thought disqualified to be a j udge simply by reason of assertedly
sub-marginal analytic skills, see Senate Casts 50-49for Manion; Controvei·siaf Choice for
Appellate Court Wins Confirmation, Wash. Post, July 24, 1 9 86, at A 1 , does not establish
that some others are qualified to be j udges sim ply by reason of assertedly outstanding
analytic skills or impressive law school academic records.
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of j udges, j urors, and 'vv itnesses . 22 This pattern su ggests t o students

that these factors do not merit serious thought by first-rate minds,
vihether in considering questions of public policy or in practicing
law.
In addition to exaggerating the salience of reasoning and "the
merits , " legal education tends to focus on a narrow fo rm of reason
ing. Analytic reason ing res pond s to the felt impossibility of think
ing about "everything" in a d i sc ip l i n ed way.

It is sufficiently

challenging that students eagerly adopt the pattern of putting aside
context. When the process is not suffic i e ntly e xplici t , however, the
"

p u tt ing aside" becomes more than a heu ristic device. Compare the

observations of the noted compa rativist , Rene David:
English law was born o f procedure, a fact which has implications
not only for the technical form of the law but for legal philoso
phy as well. English law excels in the consideration of concrete
problems and in the discovery and application of practical for
mulae.

It shows a distrust for broad principles and overly ab

stract generalizations. . . . English law is not an educating or
moralizing law, but an esoteric, technicians' law . . . . Whatever
is unrelated to litigation . . . does not concern jurists. 23

Moreover, as the Yeshiva Note illustrates, the emphasis is on
the use of reasoning to evaluate, rather than to understand or ex
plain. The result is a narrowly analytic approach to reasoning that
can quickly become disembodied from context.

The extent to

which a particular consciousness, emphasizing analysis over con
text, exists may be understood by considering a polar consciousness,
given voice by the Vietnamese monk, Thich Nhat Hanh:
Just as a piece of paper is the fruit, the combination of many
elements that can be called non-paper elements, the individual is
made of non-individual elements. If you are a poet, you will see
clearly that there is a cloud floating in this sheet of paper. With
out a cloud there will be no water; without water, the trees can
not grow; and without trees, you cannot make paper.

So the

cloud is in here. The existence of this page is dependent on the
existence of a cloud. . . . [Because the forest cannot grow without
sunshine] you can see sunshine in this sheet of paper. And if you
22. Consider the observations of the incumbent Chief Justice of the United States:
"[L]aw schools should concern themselves, perhaps more than they have in the past,
with the structure of the practicing bar. " Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62
IND. L.J. 1 5 1 , 1 5 7 ( 1 9 87); see a lso Lopez, Training Fu ture Lawyers to Work with the
Politically and Socially Subordinated: A n ti-Generic Legal Education, 9 1 W . VA. L. REV.
305, 322 ( 1 9 8 9) ("Law teachers almost obsessively study the results of formal legal
disputes but pay almost no attention to how disputes emerge and transform and to how
professional lawyering affects these emergences and transformations.").
23 . R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTU R E , SOURCES, A N D METHODOLOGY
73 (M. Kindred trans. 1 972) (footnote omitted).
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look more deeply . . . with the eyes o f those who are awake, you
see not

only the doud and the sunshine in it, but that everything

is here: the wheat that became the bread for the logger to

eat,

the

logger's father--everything is in this sheet of paper. 24

4.

Litigation Is the Most Significant Means of Processing
Disputes
Casebook introductions abound with perspective about the ex

traordinariness of litigation,25 reflecting (albeit palely) the recent ex
plosion of scholarship about the pervasiveness of far less assertive
responses to felt injustice. Yet the fact remains that the near-total
attention of students is focused on litigated cases-indeed, on those
disputes pursued to a decision on appeal. Beyond that, we do not
study the system of litigation so much as we examine the merits of
disputes, including disputes about procedure, successfully brought
through the system. Else, we would emphasize far more than we do
the availability of interim remedies (bail, preliminary inj unctions,
stays pending appeal); the effects of the structure of the market for
legal representation, of other costs of suit, of delay, and of calendar
and settlement practices; the law of justiciability and of parties; and
the efficacy of post-j udgment remedies-in short, we would empha
size the institution of adj udication.
The Yesh iva Note manifests the emphasis on doctrinal correct
ness; "Trireme" and the administrative law problem emphasize the
strength of the tendency to collapse issues of judgment, responsibil
ity, and values into questions of law. By emphasizing the correct
ness or doctrinal effect of the answers that litigated cases give to
questions of legal regulation, we overstate enormously the capacity
of litigation to answer such questions in a manner responsive to the
needs of the litigants, and encourage students to take for granted
the desire and the capacity of "the parties"-who of course were
simply "people" until a complaint was filed--to obtain an adjudica
tory answer.
5.

The Lawyer's Task Is to Make Arguments or Shape
Transactions on Behalf of the Instrumental Objectives,
Usually the Financial or Autonomy Obj ectives, of His
or Her Client
Several years ago, a first-year criminal procedure teacher at a

leading law school, after posing a hypothetical question seeking to
24. T. NHAT HANH, BEING PEACE 45-46 ( 1 987).
25. E.g., R. COVER, 0. FlSS & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE 1 -2 ( 1 988).
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recent fourth amendment decision, asked,
"If you v,;ere the Assistant District Attorney) what would y o u argue
on these facts in. opposition to a motion to suppress?" The student
answered, "If I were the A . D . A . in that case, I wouldn't oppose the
motion to suppress. " The teacher replied, "You don't belong in law
probe the contours

of
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a

school, " and called on someone else.

So crudely explicit an incident may

w ei l

be fairly rare, and may

be put aside as an "abuse. " Yet what was articulated there is im
plicit in the everyday work of law school : the emphasis on decisions
in litigated cases, which constantly portray counsel in settings
where the decision has been made to pursue claims of legal right
through j udgment (and beyond); the trivialization of "professional
responsibility" issues, not only by their conspicuous absence from
genuine engagement in the early months of law study, but by the
tendency, as in "Trireme, " to limit responsibility to the effect of
fraud, perjury, or illegality; and the "moot court" syndrome, which
identifies brief-writing and oral advocacy as the premier skill of
lawyering, to the exclusion, for example, of the ability to discern
accurately the actual (rather than the attributed) goals and priori
ties of a client. 26 Richard Wasserstrom suggests that aspects of
legal education like these imply a conception of "good lawyers" as
persons . . . who can and will bring skills and knowledge . . .
regularly and fully to bear upon any matter of concern to any
client willing and able to employ them in order to further the
client's interest, provided only that they, as lawyers, do not do
what the law prohibits lawyers from doing for clients. 27

Again, it is a polar experience that can make us aware of the im
plicit assumptions of most law school discussions of disputes. Con
sider this arresting experience recounted by Kenney Hegland:
In m y first-year contracts class, I wished t o review various
doctrines we had recently studied. I put the following:
In a long term installment contract, seller promises buyer to de
liver widgets at the rate of
eries are perfect.

1 ,000

a month. The first two deliv

However, in the third month seller delivers

only 990 widgets. Buyer becomes so incensed that he rej ects de
liveries and refuses to pay for widgets already delivered.

After stating the problem, I asked, " If you were seller, what
would you say?" What I was looking for was a discussion of the

26. Law students would, for example, learn a far more textured lesson about the
work of a lawyer if they spent a portion of their first semester carefully studying Warren
Lehman's insightful essay, The Pursuit of a Clien t 's In terest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1 078

( 1 979).
27.

Wasserstrom, Legal Education and the Good Lawyer, 34 J. LEGAL

1 5 6 ( 1 984).
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various common law theories which would force the buyer to pay

for the widgets delivered and those which \Vould throw· buyer
into breach for cancelling the remaining d eli veri es . . . .

After asking the question, I looked around the room for a
volunteer. . . .

[An eight year old son of one of my students]

raised his hand . . . .

"OK, " I said, "What would you say if you were the seller?"
"I'd say, 'I ' m sorry . ' " 2 8

6.

Little that a Student Did o r Knew Prior t o Beginning Law
Study Is Very Helpful or Relevant to the Task of Learning to
Be a Good Lawyer
That aspect of the "boot camp" psychology which views the

entering class as needing to learn to put aside (at least for a time)
the mush it has learned in college has survived the substantial de
mise of the menacing style of professorial dialogue.

Even though

the past twenty-five years has seen an acceleration in "the decline of
law as an autonomous discipline, "29 legal reasoning still tends to be
taught, especially to first-year students, as a realm of thought rela
tively insulated from others. Moreover, while the relevance of grad
uate study in other fields is now acknowledged as a valuable source
of understanding, teachers rarely bring other aspects of the prior
work and life experience of law students (more and more of whom
are well past their early twenties) into classroom consideration of
legal questions in any truly hospitable way.
The exclusion is not merely of a student's personal history,
such as prior work or study; it carries over to treatment o f the rele
vance of a student's larger sense of self, of purpose in seeking to
become a lawyer, of his or her impulse to seek understanding. In
deed, the heavy emphasis on an instrumental valuing of knowledge
and skills discourages the search-which many intellectually able
law students would welcome-for a broader knowledge than is
"needed" for the particular task at hand, and thereby impoverishes
even the search for knowledge and skills, lending law study the
seemingly nonintellectual quality that other academically oriented

28. Hegland, Why Teach Trial A dvocacy?: An Essay on "Never Ask Why, " in Es
SAYS ON THE APPLICATION OF A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE TO LAW TEACHING 68,
69 (J. Himmelstein & H. Lesnick eds. 1 98 1 ). For a slightly different version of this
incident, see K. HEGLAND, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND PRACTICE OF LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 283-84 ( 1 9 84).
29. See Posner, The Decline of Law as an A u tonomous Discip line: 1 962-87, 1 00
HARV. L. REV. 7 6 1 , 76 1 ( 1 987).

1990]

IlvfPLICIT TEA CHING

1 181

people often find in it. 30 The narrowness of the contextual discus

sion in the Yeshiva Note, for example, probably has its source in the
overly unalloyed val uing of conciseness, a sharp definition of "the
issues , " and a quickness to draw a circle of relevance to an issue.
One effect of this "privileging" of education obtained only after
enrollment in law school is to reinforce a parallel approach to the
l awyer- client rel2Jion, which powerfully legitimates professional

dominance. Gerald Lopez has observed how the tendency to incor
porate " little of everday life" into the educational program makes it
likely that "future lawyers will continue to believe that they do their
best work only and always at a distance from and without a deep
appreciation for those with whom they work . " 3 1
C.

The Infirmity in the Implicit Curriculu m
This catalogue o f implicit messages could o f course b e refined

through amendment or addition32 and, as starkly stated here, is
probably overdrawn in several respects.

Most teachers probably

devote significant energy to conveying a somewhat broader message
with respect to one or more ingredients. 33 I believe that nonetheless
the overall message of the curriculum is barely affected by such ef
forts, and that generation after generation of law students has at
tested-some happily, some with hostility or self- doubt-to the
accuracy of my hypothesis . 34
I believe, as

I have said, that many law teachers would not

avow the implicit messages that I have here sought to describe.

I

base that conclusion on conversations with a great many law teach
ers, of widely varying outlooks on legal education, over the years.
Perhaps the only "obj ective" evidence that I can marshall in sup
port of my belief is the widespread disenchantment among the pro
fessoriate with the world-view and work product of its former
students.

Again, I invite you to measure the truth of what I say

against your own experience of your colleagues.
30. "[T]he law school belongs in the modern university no more than a school of
fencing or dancing." T. VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING I N AMERICA 1 5 5 ( 1 957).
3 1 . Lopez, supra note 22, at 340 ; see id. at 3 53-54.
32. For a somewhat different array, see id. at 308-5 8.
3 3 . Recall that it is part of my thesis that many, perhaps most, law teachers' own
beliefs are closer to such a "broader message".
34. In a context that is not wholly off point, Clark Byse recently looked back on
"Fifty Years of Legal Education," and concluded: "Notwithstanding all the changes
that have occurred. it seems to me that most American law schools are not fundamen
tally different from their 1 9 3 5 predecessors. " Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education , 7 1
IowA L . REV. 1 063, 1 086 ( 1 986).
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There is a large ingredient of truth in each implicit assertion
that I have attributed to the law school experience. The distortion
comes in the partial quality of that truth, and in the pyramiding of
the assertions' mutually reinforcing effect. Taken as a wh ole, they
systematically discourage students (and faculty as well) from in
quiring into unspoken premises, whether about the legal system, the
larger social order, or the role of lawyers; they inhibit the experi
ence of choice, of human responsibility for the social constructs that
we call the law and the legal profession; they are-among other,
perhaps more serious vices-profoundly anti-intellectual.
Some teachers would subscribe to the implicit messages that I
have described. Like that of the criminal procedure teacher quoted
earlier, such avowals tend to be explicit in a most laconic way, ar
ticulated only when needed to be asserted, and then only as ipse
dixit-as premises of lawyering, to be borne in mind in the admis
sions process-without acceptance of an obligation to engage re
spectfully with those who think otherwise. But a decent respect for
the autonomy of others requires that the teacher make the avowal
part of the explicit curriculum, and present it as a central and
deeply controversial belief about justice and ethics-in short, as a
political practice that one may insist that students engage with, but
that one is not entitled to impose through pretended or real asser
tions that there are no alternative approaches to understanding or
practicing law.

Ill.

AN AITEMPTED ALTERNATIVE: THE CUNY PROGRAM

For one who shares my belief that the prevalent situation is
seriously infirm, the question is whether it is worth attempting to
conceive, articulate, and put into practice approaches that present
to law students a fuller, more open sense of the social and political
premises out of which the evolution of the substantive law, and the
shaping of norms of practice, occur-that will expand, rather than
atrophy, students' awareness of the centrality of choice, individual

f_pand societal, in law and lawyering.

I spent six years carrying on

such an attempt in connection with the founding of the City Uni
versity of New York Law School at Queens College, and it may be
useful to describe some aspects of the approach begun there to re
spond to the limitations of the implicit messages in the traditional

curriculum.
In presenting this description, I am not recommending adop

tion of the whole or any aspect of the CUNY curriculum. Even if it
had worked wonderfully at horne-and of course the result was
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something less than that-its exportability would b e dubious, for

many general and specific reasons. However, it is im portant for
those la'Vv teachers who have enduring and significant dissatisfac
tions with prevailing patterns to explore ways of going beyond
merely being dissatisfied.
with

one

specific

set

My hope is that the process of engaging

of alternatives wiH trigger constructive

thoughts about ways in which other specific alternatives may come
more fully into view.
A.

Prem ises, Purposes, and Structure
For me, the major attraction and opportunity of the founding

of a law school at the City University of New York lay in its appar
ent willingness to make a dual commitment: to make its educational
premises and purposes explicit, and at the same time open to ques
tion; and to design an educational program responsive to its prem
ises and purposes. 35 1 begin therefore with a brief summary of our
educational obj ectives as I came to understand them through the
planning process. 36
We sought to address four fundamental aspects of the learning
environment:

1.

To teach subj ect matter in ways that integrate, rather than

dichotomize, different fields, in order to facilitate, rather than im
pede, the effort to articulate and draw in question the implicit prem
ises and value choices underlying legal development;

35. When I speak of "its" willingness, I do not mean to reify the participants in the
experiment. The major actors who spoke for Queens College and the City University
were interested, for several reasons, in establishing a law school that would be some
thing other than "one more law school," and the CUNY tradition of access to those less
able to avail themselves of educational opportunities by reason of class- and race-related
barriers combined with the CUNY interest in preparing graduates for careers oriented
to public service to create a hospitable atmosphere. Charles R. Halpern, the founding
Dean, was a long-time leader in the effort to devise methods of clinical education that
equipped students to do high-quality public interest practice, and he was eager to pur
sue that effort in the context of a thoroughgoing reexamination and restructuring of law
school curricular methods and content. I remain grateful to him for the discretion that
I enjoyed as the person primarily responsible for the development of the educational
program, and for the confidence in me that he manifested, often in the face of considera
ble grounds for doubt.
36. It should be borne in mind that, notwithstanding a genuine commitment to
being explicit, the process of articulating premises and purposes is a challenging one,
which probably cannot be--and, in any event, in this case was not-accomplished all at
once, or fully at all. The process is necessarily a dynamic, developmental one, and even
a retrospective statement of premises and purposes should be seen as work in progress.
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To study le gal development in the context of lawyering de

cision-making, in order to encourage students to see that law has
significance only in reference to underlying human problems ;

3 . To study l awyering in the context of moral and political
L;r theory,
and as an aspect of interpersonal communications, in order
to encourage students to see their task as the mastery of skills that
are not disembodied from questions of identity and values in their
work;
4.

To actualize students'

capacity to be active, reflective

learners, in order to create a teacher-student relation that is less
role-defined and more e :npowering of students, so as to enhance,
rather than impair, the capacity of students to adopt in their law
practice a less role-defined, more empowering relation with their
clients.
Each of the foregoing sentences begins with a goal that is itself
a premise or means with respect to a deeper purpose, expressed in
the remainder of the sentence. But the "deeper purpose" too needs
to be subjected to the same probing process.

Why do we seek to

Ly open the values or perceptions underlying implicit premises; to view

law as an input to the human relations that shape its application to

people who are or might be clients; to view mastery of lawyering
skills as imbedded in questions of professional identity, values, and
goals; and to facilitate the restructuring of the prevalent patterns of
teacher-student and attorney-client interaction?
The more general and more fundamental educational purpose
that these goals all serve is to enable students to exercise responsibil

ity in the practice of law. The core meaning of the idea of responsi
bility is recognizing that the choices one makes as a lawyer (like
those one makes elsewhere in life) affect people's lives.

From this

recognition flows the realization that our work as lawyers can be an
affirmation, or a negation, of our values, of the goals that we want
our lives to strengthen. At CUNY, we sought to create an educa
tional program that would actualize, rather than undermine, stu
dents' aspirations toward finding in a legal career a means of
expressing their commitment to j ustice, fairness, and equality, and
that would not encourage students to set aside any such values, nor
channel them into replicating existing patterns of legal representa
tion. We sought to do this by aiding students to develop their facil
ity to reflect on what they read , on what they saw others do, and
what they themselves did; to perceive and understand the choices
and premises often implicit in the structure and work product of the
legal system; and to exercise their critical judgment in assessmg
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their response to the world around them .

Our aim was to en
courage students to reflect on their life choices, their evolving con
cept of professionalism, and the content of the law itself, in ways
that fostered their capacity to practice law in a societally useful
manner. 37

In my view, the primary task of a law school is to help students
Gexplore
the fuller meaning and implications of responsibility in law
practice. The greater part of our teaching time, however, needs to
be devoted to giving students some of what they need in order to be
responsible. The l aw school curriculum should reflect the faculty's
effort to give content to these tasks.
Knowledge of legal doctrine is of course a crucial part of what
one needs to be responsible, as is skill at the basic lawyering tasks
valued in the traditional curriculum: the ability to analyze and syn
thesize legal principles, a keen sense of relevance and procedure,
and the ability to organize and present a coherent and persuasive
line of reasoning in speech and writing. Traditional legal education
tends to value this skill and knowledge in itself, and it becomes the
goal rather than a means toward reaching the goal. As a result, the
traditional curriculum often fails to recognize, or to act on the rec
ognition, that a person needs far more than these traditionally-val
ued skills in order to be a responsible lawyer.
The "more" includes the wider range of skills associated with
clinical teaching in the narrow sense, such as planning a litigation
or other aspect of representation, interviewing and counseling cli
ents and prospective clients, conducting a trial or hearing, and ne
gotiating and drafting agreed-upon resolutions of actual or potential
disputes.

For this reason, the idea that all students should be re

quired to do some "clinica1 work" is one whose normative merit
needs to be fully acknowledged.
However, these traditional clinical skills do not sufficiently ad
dress the need. To practice responsibly, a lawyer must also have
37. This "explanation," of course, only opens further questions to inquiry, ques
tions both of clarification and of justification. I cannot pursue the question of purpose
further here, however, without diverting myself entirely from looking at the ways in
which the program sought to carry out its purposes.
A critical distinction to be borne in mind is that between teaching students that
they should be responsible in their practice and enabling them to be responsible should
they choose to do so---by teaching them something of the meaning of the idea of respon
sibility and something of what they need to know in order to be able to be responsible. I
have elsewhere explored, albeit in a format that is still terse and fragmentary, my per
ception of the question of responsibility and values. See Lesnick, The Integra tion of
R e5ponsibility and Va lues: Legal Education in an A lternative Consciousness a/Lawyering
and Law, 1 0 NOVA L.J. 6 3 3 , 6 3 3 - 3 5

( 1 986).
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acquired several more qualitative skills, primarily those o f listening,
exercising judgment, and engaging in moral reasoning.

Few law

schools today seem to consider these skills as central aspects of
clinical education. 38

Still, however broadened the concept of "skill" may be, the
need goes beyond what may be embraced by the term. The addi
tional qualities central to the education of a responsible lawyer are
as simple to state as they are difficult to expand upon, even in a
summary fashion : a developing knowledge of oneself and a develop
ing knowledge of the premises of the legal and social order.

The

former entails a commitment to experiential learning, feedback, and
reflection as primary learning modes; the latter entails a commit
ment to a substantial integration of legal theory with d octrinal or
" skills" study.
These are obviously demanding goals, very likely unreachable
in full. But only when they have all been brought within our range
of vision as genuine parts of the educational agenda is it time to
begin the difficult work of triage; else we mask priority decisions as
simple imperatives of time pressures.
The primary means by which we sought to pursue our obj ec
tives at CUNY was to restructure the work of students and teachers
in several mutually reinforcing ways.

First, we attempted to alter students'-and teachers'- experi
ence of the boundaries of a "subj ect . "

We taught contracts and

property together, in a course called Law and a Market Economy.
We separated (for the time being) a maj or portion of constitutional
law from other areas normally included in that course, and studied
it alongside related areas of nonconstitutional law, in a course that
(to make the breadth of its concept of "law" explicit) bore the
rather awkward title of Liberty, Equality, Due Process, in Histori
cal and Philosophical Context. Finally, we introduced civil proce
dure in a broadened context, suggested by the title, A dj udication
and Alternatives to Adjudication.
We sought to teach a legal "subj ect" not only as specific con
tent to be learned, whether as black-letter rules or as the "policy"
arguments for one result or another, but also as a process of human
interaction, whose understanding requires the ability to see implicit
premises and links with moral, social, and political theory.
3 8 . Cf Kronman, Living in the L a w, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 8 3 5 , 8 6 1 ( 1 987) ("The
truly distinguished lawyer, however, the one who is recognized by his or her peers in the
profession as an exemplary practitioner and whose work is marked by subtlety and
imagination, possesses more than mere doctrinal knowledge and argumentative skill.").
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we added a first-semester course explicitly focused on

lawyering issues. The course, called The \York of a Lawyer, em
braced material often found in professional responsibility and law
yering process courses, as well as some material typically not taught

in the classroom at all. By including this material in a format that
was coordinate with others, we endeavored to attest to its centrality.
By addressing questions of skill embedded in those of role, identity,
and values, v;e attested to their interconnection and brought to the
surface the consequences-and the premises- of attempting to
learn "skills" alone. 39 We sought, in all of our work with students,
to keep in the forefront of our attention questions regarding the so
cial consequences of the choices made by lawyers and the law; con
sequences to adversaries, third parties, and the legal-political order
itself were not reflexively deemed less significant than consequences
to clients.

Third,

believing that revisions in course content and design

would not suffice to accomplish the stated purposes, we explicitly
made all of the course work an input to the carrying out of simu
lated lawyering work. In what came to be called "Houses , " groups
of approximately twenty students worked in association with a
faculty member (a "House counselor") who acted as a senior law
yer-one with the time and commitment to teach his or her j uniors.
More than half of a first-year student's scheduled "class" week was
to be work done in the Houses on the simulations.
We were explicit that, in using simulations as a teaching vehi
cle we were not simply adding the teaching of skills to that of
knowledge, but were seeking to integrate both in a context that em
phasized choice, responsibility for choice, and an awareness of pur
pose. Each task that students undertook in the simulations had a
three-part structure-planning, doing, and reflection.

We spent

considerable effort seeking to overcome the tendency to over- em
phasize the "doing" phase. 40

39. The tendency to equate clinical education with "skills" training has been, in my
judgment, one of clinical education's great failings-for which many clinicians share
responsibility with other teachers, administrators, and practitioners. See the trenchant
critique by David Barnhizer, The Intellectual Contributions of Clinical Faculty: Facili
tating Fundamental Change in the American Law Schools Through Aggressive Formu
lations of Models of Justice and Humanity 5 ( 1 989) (unpublished manuscript) ("Unless
the intellectual dimensions of the law, justice, and law practice are carefully nurtured by
clinical faculty, the clinical process can become anti-intellectual, rigidly self-contained,
and suffocating. ").
40. I have set forth in an Appendix an excerpt from a memorandum prepared by
Professor Vanessa Merton (now of the Pace University School of Law) that was distrib-
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Fourth , w e greatly altered the evaluation o f s tudent work. Ex
cept in the most extreme cases of nonfeasance, course work as such
was not graded, in order to attest to our beliefs that k no w le dge "as
such" is an inchoate value and that an examination, while in a sense
an application of knowledge, typically cannot j ustifiably be termed a
simulated lawyering experience.

\Ve based evaluation of student

performance on the work done in the Houses, where knowledge and
skill were to be integrated in an application to a lawyering task.
Beyond that, evaluation endeavored to address a range of qual·
ities more closely comparable to those that are constitutive of excel
lent work in a lawyer. 4 1

We revised the indicia of quality to

emphasize the process of doing lawyers' work as well as the final
product-and in particular to encourage students to use their
House counselors as mentors-and we abjured entirely the averag
ing of grades from one semester to another, in favor of an avowedly
developmental approach. Our aim here was to encourage students
to take risks, to learn how to seek help, to learn in short how to
become lifetime self-teachers. Our expectation was that these rather
marked changes in the bases of grading would convey credibly to
students

a

broadened

concept

of

quality

lawyering

and

of

learning. 42
While it is essential, in my judgment, to articulate goals and
methods at a rather high level of generality, the effort takes on clar
ity and focus only in specific applications. I will therefore describe
with some particularity the initial simulation, which provided the
context for the opening month of a CUNY law student's course of

uted to students in the opening days of the first semester. We designed it to make
explicit this structure, and its premises and purposes.
4 1 . We evaluated student work in six areas, of which Legal Reasoning was but one.
The others were Theoretical Perspective, Clinical Judgment, Professional Responsibil
ity, Communication (embracing oral as well as written communication, and including
listening as well as speaking or writing), and Management of Effort.
42. Our approach to admissions reinforced these curricular efforts. If we were to
assert our belief that quality legal work is not wholly defined by rigorous analytical
reasoning, and that the social consequences of our professional choices are matters for
which we should accept responsibility, we could not simply replicate the traditional
criteria of "merit" in law school admissions. We scaled down sharply the weight given
to LSAT scores, and in general used the indicia of academic ability more as an absolute
criterion of admissibility than as a basis for choosing among academically qualified peo
ple. We sought to develop methods of strengthening our capacity, in making relative
judgments, to look to some of the less tangible qualities that make an outstanding law
yer: judgment, initiative, empathy, interpersonal competence, and the ability to work
collaboratively as well as independently. We believed that these criteria, valid in their
own right, would also help us obtain a student body that was diverse in its cult ural,
ethnic, racial, and "economic" composition.
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study. In light o f what 1 have asserted initially about t h e "imprint
ing" power of
devote

B.

s pe c i a l

a

student's early experience, it seems appropriate to

attention to that very special moment.

Crystallization: The A1ussel Bay Sim ulation
We designed

an

opening simulation that was factually simple,

but that would capture as full a range of the foregoing purposes as

possible; if only once, we meant to show our students "the world in
a grain of sand . " The simulation, which ran for approximately one
month, concerned a small group of people who \Vork together as a

theater group and who had recently rented a theater in "Mussel
Bay," a suburban community.43 They are interested in buying a
h o u se in the community, have found one that is to their liking, and
have reached agreement on contract terms with the seller. The bro
ker learns that a local ordinance and a deed restriction may each
prohibit ownership or occupancy by unrelated adults.

Two of the

group are a couple, not married; the buyers have said that they
want to take title in all of their names.

The seller is under some

time pressure to find a willing buyer. A neighbor is threatening ad
verse action.
We asked each student to act as a junior lawyer in a small firm
consulted by either the buyers or the seller, and to act as the client
in the opposite setting.

The simulation took the problem only

through the early stages of representation : an initial interview of a
prospective client, the decision to undertake the representation,
counseling the client regarding options, and an initial choice of op
tions by the client.
We assigned students a large number of specific tasks in the
simulation. In role, they conducted an initial interview of a pro
spective client; prepared a memorandum to the firm on the case,
with a description of the client's goals and priorities and a recom
mendation whether to undertake the representation; prepared a
memorandum to the firm on the legal issues presented, with an
analysis of the options, followed by a letter to the client outlining
options;44 conducted a counseling interview with the client; and (as
43. The description that follows does not accord completely with any single year's
version of what we asked students to do. Each year, we introduced some changes in the
setting and tasks.
44. The options that students most often perceived were: to seek another house or
buyer; to go through with the sale and purchase despite the risk; to seek a waiver,
variance, or exemption from the local body that enforces the ordinance; to seek an
accommodation with the neighbor or with the relevant local officials; or to bring suit in
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students

wrote memoranda reflecting on each lawyer-client meeting; received
feedback from their clients on each meeting and on the client letter,
in one-on-one meetings and in group sessions in which the House
counselors participated; and prepared feedback agendas in prepara
tion for the feedback meetings.
Students met with their House counselor and small groups of
colleagues to plan each step in the process. In that connection, they
generated information needs, including needs for knowledge of the
law, which were responded to in course sessions, to some extent in
supplementary sessions in House, and to some extent in student in
dividual and group work.
We designed the problem to draw on all of the fall semester
courses, which followed a syllabus that enabled students to address
relevant aspects of the simulation as the House work progressed :
(a)

From Law and a Market Economy : ownership as the

power to exclude; covenants running with the land, as a link be
tween contracts and property; the interplay between facilitative and
regulatory approaches to private ordering with respect to land;
(b)

From Liberty,

Equality,

Due Process: eighteenth and

twentieth century perceptions of property as an ingredient of, and
as a threat to, personal liberty; private and public restrictions on
land use as protecting, and as impairing, freedom of association; the
Constitution as higher law;
(c)

From A djudication and A lternatives to A djudication : for

mal and informal methods of processing disputes; the structure and
value bases

of adjudication

and

of negotiated

and

mediated

processes; the phases of a lawsuit; the federal system of courts and
law-making;
(d)

From The Work of a Lawyer : accurate listening, and ac

curate identification of client priorities and obj ectives, as lawyering
skills; introduction to interviewing and counseling skills; the deci
sion whether to undertake a representation; lawyer and client roles
in the counseling setting, including the place of the lawyer's priori
ties and objectives; authority and autonomy within a firm, and

state or federal court, seeking to establish the inapplicability or unenforceability of the
restrictive covenant and ordinance.
45. Once, we ended the simulation by having the students, in role as lawyers, meet
briefly in groups defined by the choice among the options made by the student who
played their client. This was done to bring home to them how dramatically a client's
choice may affect the task facing a lawyer, and thereby to supply a powerful experiential
context for discussion of issues of client autonomy and professional expertise.
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within the nrofession; introduction to the structure, content, and
status of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
1\!Iodel Rules of Professional Conduct.
It is useful to look bac:k o ver the ways in which the lVIussel Bay
simulation was intended to further concretely a number of the
School' s educational objectives. To do so makes manifest the rich
ness of the simulation method and the interrelation of educational
obj ectives.
1.

The problem presents "the law" as something that lawye rs

need to learn in order to carry on their work, rather than

as

some

thing that students need to learn in order to be tested, ranked, and
certified.
2.

It presents the study of law through a number of subjects

that, though divided from one another for some teaching purposes,
students perceive as connected parts of a single whole.

3.

By beginning on the second day of law school and having

the students participate actively from the next day, the problem
places the students in an active stance-talking, meeting, and writ
ing-at the very outset.

By the end of the first month, students

have done three pieces of writing in role, and four or five out of role,
had two interviews as lawyers and two as clients, and made impor
tant decisions in three different contexts .
4.

The problem allows the planning and reflection/feedback

stages to be carried on through group as well as individual work, so
that students learn to work collaboratively as well as individually,
and learn that they can learn from one another as well as from the
faculty.
5.

The problem illustrates how legal doctrine grows out of

human responses to human problems, and tends to become a struc
ture that loses its connection with that source.

6.

It intertwines private and public law issues and allows so

called private areas, such as enforcement of contracts (including
those seeking to create rights and duties in third parties) and the
right of property owners to exclude, easily to be seen as embedded
in state regulation.

7.

The problem is one in which, although the merits of any

lawsuit are relevant, adjudicatory responses are clearly of limited
responsiveness to the clients' needs-the seller needs a prompt, in
expensive solution; the buyers need a prompt solution that will not
alienate the community.
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The problem introduces students immediately t o the law

yering skills of interviewing and counseling; and thereby attests to
their centrality as aspects of quality work as a l awyer.

It does so,

however, in a context that emphasizes the critical part that list2n
ing, exercising judgment, and addressing questions of client auton
omy and professionalism play in the mastery of those skills.

This

process is aided by placing the students in the role of client as well
as lawyer.
9.

The problem raises the question of what it means to prac

tice in a private, fee-generating setting with an orientation to the
public interest, and how "political" concerns-the impact and legit
imacy of restrictions on private living arrangements- can and
should interact with counseling and representational choices.

1 0.

The problem introduces students to the skill of "legal

writing" in a context in which :
a)

students see writing in a legal setting not wholly sep

arate from writing generally;
b)

students see writing as not reflexively more impor

tant than other interpersonal skills;
c)

legal writing is not over-identified with advocacy;

d)

the traditional writing skills of clarity and coherence

are valued, but in a setting that asks the writer to keep the intended
reader, and other aspects of the context, clearly in mind, and that
makes it plain that reader and context are situation-specific.

1 1.

The problem has no clearly satisfactory response, and in

troduces students to the skill of exercising clinical judgment.46

IV.

CONCLUSION/BEGINNINGS

I imagine that it is clearer to most readers than it was to me
eight years ago that, although one may wisely aspire to envision
infinity in a grain of sand, it is in the nature of infinity that i t cannot
be captured on a canvas and sketched out to be apprehended and
absorbed. The very holism of the CUNY design was its greatest
flaw: even if a faculty could be found that was willing to adopt so
46. Of course, far more is required than a suitable problem if an educational pro
gram is to create an atmosphere hospitable to learning to exercise judgment. A good
educational program must emphasize openness to reflection and feedback, and learning
from experience, as central aspects of that skill. In order to facilitate the strengthening
of that quality, it must emphasize learner-directed feedback, the subordination of evalu
ation to feedback, and a developmental approach to mastery and evaluation. These
elements were central aspects of the CUNY concept, although they are only suggested
in the descriptions above.
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integrated and comprehensi ve a design, with the d eg re e of rej ection

of division of labor that it entailed, the design would inevitably
prove too partial and fragmentary . _.!\ grain of sand is not capable of
providing neophyte lawyers with a sufficiently layered experience,
and a three-year's succession of Mussel Bays was simply beyond us,

faculty and students alike.
Perhaps I am simply making a virtue out of necessity, but I
find a fair amount of cheer in this conclusion. For the real question

is not what "legal education" will do in response to the critique I
have offered in this essay. The answer to that is clear: legal educa
tion will go on as it has, changing ever-so-slowly, sometimes but not
always for the better, while rejecting, deflecting, and absorbing criti
cism. The real question is what those law teachers who find signifi
cant merit in a particular critique can and will do in response to
shape their own teaching.
In that context, it seems to me that the pursuit, in a more tradi
tional setting, of but one or a few of the goals or methods that went
to make up the overall CUNY concept may be a more useful under
taking than I was willing to concede eight years ago. Each of us as
an individual contributes, no matter what our views and actions, no
more than a grain (or two) of sand to the evolution of the law and
its practice; the clarity with which we each undertake that work can
be greatly aided by grounding it, if not in infinity, in a set of prem
ises and purposes that is the product of our own reflection.
A critical failing of legal education is that it is structured to
discourage rather than encourage such searching. The emphasis on
scholarship as compared to teaching, and on the study and teaching
of law as compared to that of lawyering, is an aspect of this struc
ture, for it tends to produce a faculty whose primary interest is in
bringing to bear its considerable intellectual resources on thinking
about legal regulation, and much less on grappling with the
processes of becoming and being a lawyer. Another structural fac
tor is the way that law school curricula tend to be built as amalgams
of indiv1 dual preferences, rather than through the assumption of re
sponsibility for the shape of the whole by any person or institution,
whether dean, committee, or faculty.47

47. On both of these aspects, the following casual j ustificatory description of law
faculties by a President of the Association of American Law Schools is revealing:
The chief loyalty of the faculty may be to their various disciplines rather
than to the dean or the school-and, if the faculty is to have the scope to
develop its own intellectual interests in productive ways that redound to
the luster of the institution, such a priority cannot be condemned.
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But discouragement is not prohibition. It is open to us as indi
vidual teachers to be aware of and

resist the tendency generated by

prevailing structures, and such resistance does not require changing
the structures themselves. It is no more necessary than it is possible
for an individual teacher, or a group of individuals, to undo the

major structures that shape legal education. What may be possible
is for those who see the importance of doing so to restructure their

own teaching in ways that will help them to make students aware of
the implicit premises of the legal and social order, including the
educational venture in which they are participating, and to explore
the functions and limits of those premises, and their implications for
students' work as lawyers.

Responsible lawyering at bottom calls

upon one to struggle to be aware of what choices one does have and
of what lies beyond choice. 48 We as teachers model such responsi
bility when we carry on that effort with regard to the evolution of
our own teaching.
It matters less whether you find the particular vision that
animated the CUNY experiment

a

source of insight than whether

you seek to discern a set of premises and purposes that gives focus
and direction to the evolution of your own teaching. Alone if neces
sary, in collaboration with one or more colleagues if possible,49
there is much each of us can accomplish to make our pedagogy
more fully expressive of our perception of the world of law and
lawyering.
Kay, President's Message Nurturing Deans, A. AM. L. SCHS. NEWSL., Sept. 1 989, at 4.
48. Warren Lehman has written insightfully of this concept:
There is the problem. I do not think I like what this client wants to do,
but I would feel very uncomfortable raising the issue. What, then, do I as
a lawyer do? Here is the difficult answer: I admit to myself that I cannot
talk to a particular client who is off-putting or overwhelming or cock
sure, and that I would probably be a better person and lawyer if I could.
This seems costly because it requires first that I take the trouble to dis
cover in each case what I ought to do, and second that I recognize that,
like every other human being, I cannot do everything. Neither the intro
spection nor the confession is comfortable. It is no wonder we are
tempted to avoid them.
Lehman, supra note 26, at 1082-8 3 .
49. A number o f schools, no more hospitable than most t o significant institutional
modifications in their educational program, appear to be more hospitable to the idea of
authorizing a faculty group to develop experimental enclaves, in some cases even for the
first year curriculum.
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APPENDIX
THE

�WORK OF A CUNY LAw STUDENT :

SIMU LATION AND THE EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING PROCESS50

By

Vanessa Mert0n

[T]he work you do as part of a simulation is selectively, but not
exactly, the same as what you would do as a lawyer confronted with
a comparable problem. By drastically shortening the time frame of
the actual process, the simulation allows you to to experience the
consequences of your choices relatively quickly.

In a simulation,

you are asked to assume certain roles, and to engage in a variety of
tasks, some in-role and some out-of-role (except for the ubiquitous
role of "law student").
engage

m

The generic set of tasks you are asked to

are:

1)

planning-identifying your purpose, your options, and

making some deliberate choices;
doing-carrying out the plan you develop, making the

2)

adjustments that seem required in light of your underlying
purpose;
3)

reflecting- seeking to understand what happened, why

it happened, and what and how you are learning about lawyering
and yourself as a lawyer.

Then the process starts over, with trying the same or similar
task again, keeping in mind what you learned from what you did
the first time. That is the essence of experiential learning, which we
will ask you to do again and again and what lawyers who are willing
to learn from their experience do throughout their careers.
This sequence is the unifying pattern of the many stages of this
and future simulations .

Each stage is important, but we want to

place special emphasis on the planning and reflecting phases of the
work we engage in. We do not expect you to, and hope that you
will not try to, achieve perfection in your performance of lawyering
tasks the first time out-or the second, or the fifteenth. Through
the simulation, we do hope that you will be able to develop the self
reflective approach to work that will enable you to continue to learn
from the chaotic, largely unstructured, uncontrolled experience of
being a lawyer.
50. This

memorandum was prepared by Professor Merton for distribution to

entering CUNY law students and is on file at the UCLA Law Review office. See
note 40 and accompanying text.

supra
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We believe that the simulation method offers certain advan
tages over the two models of legal education that preceded it . One
model, the apprenticeship model tha t prevailed until the last quar
ter of the last century , involved the supervision of a working lawyer.
The other model, sometimes called the Langdellian or case method
. . . has come to mean reading lots of appellate opinions and in large
lecture-type classes discussing the legal p rinci p les th e y illustrate.
The focus under the first system was very strongly on doing, learn
ing in almost a rote method by following very carefully the rules or
techniques that a supervising lawyer used in his-and then it

was

h is-work, with little attention to the apprentice's developing a
sense of generalizable principles or legal theory .

The emphasis in

the second model, to some extent in reaction to the first, was on

thinking, with very little attention to learning how to apply in prac
tice the theory and concepts that were discussed in the class, and no
attention at all to the possible disparities between, for example, the
facts that the j udges writing the appellate opinions chose to include
and those that may have actually existed.
Our curriculum incorporates substantial elements of both these
models, and seeks to integrate their strengths and minimize their
shortcomings . . . .
In that connection, lawyers need to learn to take calculated
risks. A theme we will return to again and again is the impossibility
of achieving perfection in professional work. No matter how care
fully we plan, however talented and knowledgeable we are, we will
always make mistakes.

What simulation offers is the chance to

make those mistakes in a protected environment in which the conse
quences of the mistake is not that a client is injured or a cause is
lost, but rather that you learn something about the law and law
yering.

Since learning is the goal, the "mistake" or " failure" is

translated into success. This is not to suggest that you set out to
make mistakes; just that the inevitable mistakes have a different
meaning in the simulation context.
Ours is a self-reflective approach to the lawyer's role. We do
not want to teach in a way that students simply accept the tradi
tional role axiomatically. We want students to have greater choice
about how to integrate who they are as persons with what kind of
lawyers they want to be. That is no easy task. Learning to fashion
a lawyer's role that expresses who you are and is responsive to the
needs of others requires continual reflection on the choices we tend
to make

r e fle x iv e ly

and on the other options available.

It requires
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attention not only to what w e are doing but t o w h o we are becom

ing. That task, a central part of the mission of this law school, can
not be approached abstractly .

It requires doing and reflecting and

learning from doing. The simulation mode is ideal for that end.

